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The Decision to Realize Hydraulic Potentia1 1
The contrad; ct; on ; nherent ; n a potent; all y hydrau 1 ; c 1 andscape ; s
man; fest.

Such a 1andscape has an ; nsuffi c; ent ra i nfa 11 or none at all,

but it possesses other accessible sources of water supply.

If man decides

to utilize such sources, he may transform dry lands into fertile fields and
gardens. He may, but will he? What makes him engage in an adventure which
involves great effort and which is fraught with highly problematic institutional consequences?
Historical evidence reveals that numerous groups of persons have made
this decision; it also reveals that many others have failed to do so.

Over

millenia, tribal gatherers, hunters, fishermen, and pastoralists inhabited
potentially hydraulic regions, often in close proximity to irrigation
farmers, but few abandoned their traditional occupations for a hydroagricul tural way of 1 ife.
The agrari an a 1ternati ve had a 1 imi ted--and very di verse--appea 1 to
nonfarming groups when cUltivation was primitive and leadership not overly
demanding.

After the emergence of stratified agricultural societies,

choice became even more serious. The authority wielded by governments and
wealthy landowners of nearby agararian states acted as a deterent, because
under these conditions the shift might involve submission to distasteful
methods of political and proprietary control.

Although women, children,

and war captives might till a few fields close to a campsite, the dominant
members of the tribe, the adult males, stubbornly refused to abandon their
hunting, fishing, or herding activities.

The many primitive peoples who

endured lean years and even long periods of famine without making the

10rganization and paraphrasing of this section are from: K. A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism (Chapter 1, pt D). New Haven: Val e University
Press, 1957.
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crucial changeover to agriculture demonstrates the il1111ense attraction of
nonmaterial values when increased material security can be obtained only at
the price of political, economic, and cultural submission.
The transition to irrigation farming poses the problem of choice in a
still more complex form.

The primary choice--whether or not to start

hydroagricu1 ture where it had not been known previous1y--was generally,
though perhaps not exclusively, made by groups familiar with the techniques
of primitive rainfall farming. Notwithstanding such background, the choice,
once made, brought wi th ita new rea 1 i zati on: i rri gati on farmi ng ao1ways
requires more physical effort than rainfall farming performed under comparable conditions.
But

it requires radical, social and political adjustments only in a

special geohistorical setting.

Strictly local tasks of digging, damming,

and water distribution can be performed by a single husbandman, a single
fami 1y, or a sma 11 group of nei ghbors and, in thi s case, no far reachi ng
organizational steps are necessary.

Hydroagriculture--farming based on

small scale irrigation--requires more effort and increases the food supply,
but does not involve the patterns of organization and social control that
characterize hydrau1 ic agricu1 ture and "oriental despotism."
These patterns come into being when an experimenting community of
farmers or protofarmers find large sources of moisture in a dry but potentially fertile area.

If irrigation farming depends on the effective hand-

1 ing of a major supply of water, the distinctive qual ity of water--its
tendency to gather in bu1k--becomes institutionally decisive. A large
quantity of water can be channeled and kept within bounds only by the use
of mass labor, and this mass labor must be coordinated, disciplined, and
led.

Thus, a number of farmers eager to conquer arid lowlands and plains

are forced to invoke the organizational devices which--on the basis of
2

premachine technology--offer their one chance of success: they must work in
cooperatf on wi th thei r fe 11 ows and subordi nate themselves to a df recti ng
authori ty.
The representi ti ves of ra i nfa 11 farmi ng made hi story and contro 11 ed
certain areas of the Western World which were uniquely suited to this'kind
of economy.

But the hydrau 1"i c agri cu 1 tu ri sts outgrew and outfought the

majority of all neighboring peoples wherever local conditions and international circumstances one-sidedly favored an agromanageria1 economy and
attendant statecraft.

The pioneers of hydrau1 ic agricu1 ture, 1 ike the

pioneers of rainfall farming, were unaware of the ultimate consequences of
their choice.

Pursuing recognized advantage, they initiated an insti-

tuti ona 1 deve 1opment. whi ch 1ed far beyond the starti ng poi nt.

Thei r hei rs

and successors built colossal political and social structures but they did
so at the cost of many of those freedoms which the conservative dessentors
endeavored and, in part, were able to preserve.
The Physical and Cultural Situation in Our Day

At this moment in history, there is still little necessity for rainfed
regions to to be concerned with irrigation, even though some turning toward
small and individualized hydro developments in special zones can be
detected.

The chief pressure for irrigation is in the old historic areas

and in certain regions where bulk water could not be harnessed

in earlier

times due to lack of technique or inability to control its application.
In traditional areas, expanding irrigation is a matter of improving
existing systems along with possible enlargement of facilities.

In China,

for example, considerable expansion apparently has been possible by joining
some modern construction knowledge with human-core energy.
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Nontraditional areas obviously have a narrower historic irrigation
foundation upon which to build and must develop physical infrastructure and
create administrative institutions from the very beginning.

Once the

process is begun, it soon becomes clear that water storage and conveyance
is a matter of corralling capital to apply technique.

Also, resulting

system operation may not be successful unti 1 farmers have made necessary
mental shifts that enable them to accept the control or regimentation that
is necessary to make a collective organization workable.

(Much of the

previous discussion al so appl ies to pumping situations; al though, -it is
probable that a little more flexibility is retained for individuals in such
hydroagronornY si tua ti ons. Cf. Ke 11 er & P1ocher, 1984.)
In summary, there is a cultural dimension that must be taken into
consideration in irrigation development.
This requirement has shaped many of the elements that form the history
of the Western U.S.A in the modern era.
issue always has been:

In the arid West, an underlying

how can society obtain the benefits that private

inititive confers in development, yet temper individuals' self-interest
inside a collective? Unfettered individualism must be given up, yet inititive retained. But this amalgam has been difficult to affect or sustain
beyond the level of "mutual irrigation companies" except on a foundation
of pu b1 i c su bs i dy.

(W i 1 de, 1 97 6a & b; 1 978)

In other cultures, it may be natural for farmers to understand and
work within a framework of coll ecti ve interests, but the 1 arger society
will not be able to obtain
tion and enterprise.

dynamic economic impacts of individual innova-

An example of this might be found in the strong group

traditions of an indigenous society such as is found among the indians in
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the Andean Highlands.

Here, even an overlay of compensating (ameliorating)

subsidy may not call forth incentive.2 (Aitken,1983)
Water Source Tenure
One way or another, those who develop a water source and conveyance
structures have to be guaranteed ownership rights.

If these rights are.

retained by the State, the possible implication is that only the State is
in a position to guide and manage

what is created.

On the other hand,

if individuals or groups have recognized tenure rights to water sources,
automatic development will tend to occur.3

This may be seen in cases where

a group re 1ys on a natu ra 1 source such as a spri ng. Each fami 1y uti 1 i zes
the water in turn to the degree it can be Nstretched out. II
·A person may. lise 11 II
water or access to it.

water to others if he

can contro 1 ei ther the

This type of ownership, of a necessary and vital

source, causes conflict even to a greater degree than in situations where
land is monopolized.4

If the State owns all the water, then, as ancient

history has shown, the population will be subject to many controls of
centra 1 i zed power.

Howe ver, if the State does not choose to di rect all

things in a despotic way, the farmers may not do all things with the
created system that is technically feasible.
management control

That is, if the State retains

and sti 11 expects vol unta'ry response, it may be

2An Andean counter example in a non-highl and, contrasting cultural
situation is illustrated by the explosion of atomistic irrigation development inititive in Equador's Guayas Basin, in a situation of hydroagronomY,
fueled by good producemarkets. (WMS, #121982).
3Tenure does not have to extend to the source itself, although in the
case of a spring it might. It is sufficient if "tenure" is simply a
usufruct ri ght to the "producti on" of the source.
4There is a tendency to try to control land areasgreat enough to
utilize all the source, then there will be no surplus to guard or protect.
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disappointed at the response from farmers.

This suggests a possible rule

of development; the state should only develop and control a source down to
a 1 evel where it can create the counterpart of a "spring" for potential
users 1yi ng be low.

The· users mi ght be expected to Ilreach up" the system as

far as possible to find their "spring" and be responsible to develop and
. manage

a 11 the area commanded by thi s sUb-source. 5

Water Development
In the first instance the collective can be left to its own devices.
That is to say. if the "members" have tenure to a "spring" they can proceed
along certain development paths themsel ves--this merely requires

some

degree of initiative and imagination (which is rewarded by the results) •
. If a larger collective identifies a "spring," size and technical
requirements for development may be too great for private initiative.
Whether or not pri vate i ni ti ati ve is up to the task depends upon agreed
tenure rights and potential economic
In the Western

u.s.

p~offs.

the economic payoffs were uneven; early irrigation

companies, established as profit making entities, failed.

On the other

hand, the easy development of smaller scale sources (mainly river diversions)

based on investment of human and animal capital (not bank loans) ,

in a spirit of mutual self-help were more successful.
I n modern ti mes State mandated deve 1 opment of pub 1 i c works has been
rational ized on various grounds.

One of the most commonly cited · is the

i nabi 1 i ty of a di verse group of water users to obtai n

5This suggestion has been made by Jack Keller.
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1 arge amounts of

(G. Levine)

investment capital.6 Obviously, once built such works are not likely to be
any more profi tab 1 e for the State than they wou 1 d be for pri vate enterprise, especially since all easily developed areas have already been
exploited.

In addition, earlier irrigation

to command the best 1 ands.
existing

simp1~

works may have been situated

Of course, the State may be abl e to improve

systems by introducing storage of late season water by

irrigating additional land on the boundaries of what already exists or it
may

be able to direct some water away from current users

to be employed

elsewhere.
As projects become more complex, legal considerations po1iferate.
Tenure rights and their enforcement exact more and more attention and
resources.

Additional legal and legislative adjustments are needed to

reso1 ve questions of project financing.

If water beneficiaries are re-

quired to bear some financial burdens, additional restrictions are placed
upon individuals because the money must be collected. An engineering and
administrative technostructure emerges and eventually gathers to itself the
trappings of power and control that authority to move and shift vital
resources confers (i.e., a modern version of oriental despotism).
Measuring Social Benefits of Irrigation Developement
One reason why the concept of lithe spri ng" is important is because no
one expects even a vol untary, non-profit co11 ecti ve to expend effort or
resources in development unless potential payoffs are expected to cover the
costs. Assuming the collective evaluates its alternatives carefully and

6There is no doubt that enormous amounts of pri vate capital can be
amassed for projects which contain adequate guarantees. But financing is a
problem where the land security consists of a lot of separated farms,
since the structures to be built are of little use to anyone except familes
who work the lands below them.
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that markets for the necessary labor, capital, and other inputs are relatively free, any decision to go forward is a rough indication that society,
as a who 1 e, wi 11 benefi t to a grea ter degree than if an a 1 terna te use of
the resources would have been chosen.

In other words, a

"correct" evalu-

ation of society's opportunity costs is made somewhat automatically by
numerous market forces playing themselves out in the private arena.
The same opportunity cost principle may be invoked when evaluating
economic choices made by the State. Indeed, such application is important
because large projects tend to be expensive, and often return less than the
va 1 ue of thei r constructi on and support resources, as measured by thei r
value in alternative uses.

The mere fact that the expected benefit/cost

ratio exceeds unity during the planning phase does not guarantee economic
success in operation.
scarce resources.

Irrigation projects that flop waste publicly owned
Thi s hurts all ci ti zens. 7

It should not be imagined that society actually will be reimbursed for
the resources it devotes to irrigation works whether successful or failed.
Such a felecific arrangement would only exist if the direct beneficiaries
were charged
by the State.B

the full costs of the water conveyance features constructed
In practice, such levies are not made although the farming

population obtains most though not all of the direct benefits.
whether or not society gains on

Thus,

balance from committing resources to irri-

gation works depends upon whether the net value of increased farmer production is great enough to raise GNP by an amount commenserate with the

7private projects may fail as well, but society does not bear all the
costs since part of the failure is accounted for by destruction or loss of
private capital or of the private labor embodied during construction.
BIf they are charged with the "full cost," win or lose then the
pub 1i c wi 11 be rei mbursed for the opportuni ty costs or ffie resources committed to construction even if the project fai 1 s.

B

annua 1 i zed costs of the proj ect. The increase in GNP must be as great or
greater than the increase in the net value of production as compared to the
"wi thout project" state.
In some cases, of course, the State does not expect blc > 1.

The

decision to subsidize is often but not always an indication that noneconomic considerations are quite important; some goals besides enhanced
production are invo1ved. 9
Existence of subsidy can mean only one of two things.

Supposing

stated project goal s are all economic. Subsidy may be interpreted torepresent a hope that some secondary economi c benefi ts wi 11 be created by the
project.

Such benefits are hard to measure.

Studies of regional economic

impacts of big u.S. water projects are inconclusive. Not much impact on
'.

local economy can be attributed to them.

If there are some explicit or

imp1 icit we1 fare goal s, the subsi dy to irri gation may ·be justified on that
basis.

The whole Western u.S. irrigation program was never expected to pay

its costs--the program had social not production goals as its foundation.
The benefits of irrigation expenditures become even harder to measure
when mul tipl e-purpose projects are invol ved.

In the U.S.A., such purposes

as flood control and recreation are not expected to repay costs.

They are

subsidized because they are assumed to confer important social benefits of
a consumptive nature.

They are termed consumptive because such benefits do

not involve production or direct enhancement of economic activity.
Public subsidy of very widely distributed consumptive activities such
as benefits from education and defense systems or even new roadways is
taken for granted.

The tax i ng expendi ture patterns ha ve an appea rance of

citizens paying themselves, since those who bear the subsidy by and large

9Let us call such goals welfare enhancement.
9

obtain the benefits.
must be paid for.

No matter how welcome, however, enhanced consumption

When the incidence of the subsiqy burden'falls upon the

general exchequer, the question is: how far is society willing to subsidize
consumption (for welfare purposes) of a select group?

An example of a

consumptive activity directly related to irrigation project investment is
to create water for lawns and gardens.

In such cases there is little doubt

that local social welfare has gone up even if measured local or national
economic impacts are negligible (and it is also possible that national
social welfare has gone up'but that seems unlikely-and that the rest of the
"L:P

I".

nation is willing to pay the subisidy involved). l"Realized, farm level,
'.

direct economic benefits can be measured.
small

Calculations have been made

u.s. irrigation projects isolated from urban centers. Some of these

results show
tations.

incremental production benefits in excess of planning expec-

Nevertheless,such projects still involve considerable subsidy

"-

since direct beneficiaries do not pay interest on construction outlays.
The World Bank re-evaluates irrigation projects from time to time and
has published some results showing positive rates of return.l0 Evaluations
by other donors also cite some economic successes.

Re-evaluations based on

primary beneficiary data which show success are unexceptionable.

Less

confidance should be placed on positive results built upon valuation of
in direct benefi ts.

Markets--The Iron law
The American domestic market is so large that reclamation project
designers chose to ignore whether new and additional productive output

10 IDB also reports some positive results for a group of small projects
in Peru. In thi s case, the enti re i rri gat; on "program" costs were not reevaluated; evaluation covered the 60-70% of the program money actually
invested in "hardware."
10

could be absorbed without price effects.

Price fluctuations due to

vagaries of climate would outweigh any weakening effects of adding to
supply.

Subsidies were paid in order that reclamation farmers could

hold costs down, while the expected higher yields would increase farm
revenues at the going prices.
Agricultural leaders in other regions of the nation always complained
about recl amation activities supported by the publ ic purse because they
objected to

subsidy of increased production which appeared to be unneeded

or unnecessarily ·competitive with what could be produced under rainfed
conditions. They were smart enough to realize that any output increases
were bound to depress market prices to some degree, no matter how slight,
and to that extent the farmers in their own areas would be hurt.II
Technical and General lessons in American Public Irrigation Experience
The technical lesson is that just because irrigation increases yields
and, therefore, national production, this is not a guarantee that irrigation programs are an economic success.

What really counts is whether the

profi ti bi 1 ty of the producti on increases is great enough fi rst to pay for
the extra costs of production and induce farmers to work harder (as required by intensive agriculture) and, in addition, give a further increMent
of returns great enough to offset the cost of the project.12

IlSince the Second World War, the complaints have been muted because
surp 1 uses of some commodi ti es were due 1 ess or not at a 11 to subsi di zed
rec1amstion production, than to price supports by the government, and, in
more recent times, the market for U.S. products has expanded greatly due to
high volumes of export.
12 By this test, much American "reclamation" experience has been a
fai 1ure.
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American reclamation project

farmers did raise output and did make

somewhat more money (thus sati sfyi ng the fi rst part of the profi tabi 1 i ty
requirement) but they were never asked to pay full cost.
unlikely that profitability of many

And, it is

projects would have been great enough

to have permitted it. Inability to pass the second part of the profitability test was always accepted by reclamation program administrators.
got around this problem by utilizing

r~venues

They

from the sale of generated

electric power or municipal and industrial water to subsidize the costs of
constructing expensive irrigation features.
The general lesson is that profitability depends upon markets. Other
nations cannot get away with what the Americans have attempted in the name
of "reclamation" and social equity.
At the same ·time, they cannot ignore the impact new project production
will have upon existing markets.

If farmers on irrigation projects in-

crease output of agricultural products, it is possible that other farmers
may lose sa 1 es. Thus, GNP wi 11 not increase as much as expected. On the
other hand, unless there are markets, there is little hope of obtaining, at
the national level, clear gains in GNP at overall profitabilities
exceeding· social opportunity costs plus rewards to farmers for extra inputs
and effort.
Conditions for Positive Economic Benefits from Irrigation in LOC's
Although instances of success are reported in World Bank or .other
evaluations, it is difficult to imagine any more than a narrow spectrum of
situations where irrigation plays a natural, successful economic role.· As
mentioned, the key variable is markets. Only if they are adequate is there
any hope for farmers to cover production as well as construction costs.
Markets for expanded agri cu 1 tu ra 1 outpu t may be opened up due to import

12

substitution or via foreign sales.
ities.

These are the main short-run possibi1-

Longer-run domestic markets expand due to higher on-farm consump-

tion, more raw material requirements to process intermediate food products,
some up-grading of tastes for higher value crops and greater meat consumption, but mostly there is normal demand growth due to increases in popu1ati on. A11 to 1 d, domesti c long-run markets may expand at about 4t-St per
year.

In a large country such as India, such percentages might represent a

large absolute outlet for the increases of local production associated with
irrigation construction.

In a small nation, such percentages might not

represent an absorbtive capacity greater than what could be satisfied from
a small project or from technically achievable advances in yields within
the structure of the existing agricultural system.
Mainly the Far.erls View
As noted, there is no necessary convergence of private and social
vi ewpoi nts about proj ect "success". Therefore, from the standpoi nt of a
project farmer, there is an additional outlet for his proposed production
increase:
producers.13

he can take markets away from already established domestic
Whil e it is unl ikely that the average farmer woul d analyse

his participation in a proposed project in such terms, project planners and
donor agenci es ha ve no excuse for i gnori ng the zero sum and other market
consequences yet they do it all the time.

The evidence for this is found

in the fact that planners put projects into place that are too high

~ost

to

be successful, that is, they actually do not cut the pie differently

13This is accomplished in two ways: by driving down prices with a
flood of excess supplies and by absolute pul ling of customers away from the
older sources of supply by means of some sort of service or price incentive.

13

because the exi sti ng, tradi ti ona 1 areas of producti on can ho 1d thei r own.
Project farmers may not exploit an "additional outl et" at all.
With this in mind, we will now concentrate on situations that do not
involve beggar-thy-neighbor, instead project development is aimed at an
"expanded" or "identified" market (say import substitution).
AI.

Markets avai 1ab1 e--government wi 11 control food imports.
i.

I f another area or zone has greater compari ti ve advantage
than the proposed proj ect, and can expand, new i rri gati on
cannot pay unless expected unit costs are "right."14 A rise
in real GNP depends on whether the marginal social costs of
the increment of increased production are at least as low as the
uni t costs of on-farm inputs in the exi sti ng, competi ng zone.

ii.

If there is no other producing area with comparative advantage,
project output should raise real Gross National Product (GNP) to
the degree that expected uni t costs are be low the a 1 ternati ve
costs of imports.

This combination of factors delineates the

situation most suitable for irrigation investment.
iii. Argument is the same for export crop production.
A2 • Domestic markets available--government cannot be relied upon to control imports
i.

A new project must be ab1 e to undercut import prices as well as
rainfed alternatives in order to halt imports or take some rainfed share.

If, for any reason, rainfed costs start to fall,

14There is a grey zone where farmer unit costs are low enough , to
outcompete the alternative source for the new market, but not low enough
to create an adequate margin to al so cover the social costs of the irrigati on proj ect.

14

competition intensifies. Consumers may gain but the projects
are uneconomi c.
ii.

A search for abso1ute-advantage-type crops begins. Project planners decide that farmers will be led, asked, or told to

iii. A new project must be able to undercut import prices as well
plant "high powered" fruit and vegetable

crop~

but market out-

lets such crops are always narrow and extremely sensitive to
alterations in supply, so the plan may fail.

Even if a partic-

ular project manages successful penetration, follow-on projects
cannot copy the process.

Success of the initial

be replicated except as the passage of time

project cannot
alters absolute

absorbtive capacity.
A3 •

It is possible to think in terms of "expanded" markets even in the
absence of exports, or import substitution if there is absolute hunger.

In order to fi 11 a "hunger" gap the project must be very low

cost, otherwise it may be better to import (for for some indeterminate
length of time) rather than tie up scarce resources in noncompetitive
facilities.
B.

Markets not avai1able--[this is not a realistic situation in which to
inject new
i•

projects].

As noted a new proj ect can on 1y be a commerci a 1 success at the
expense of surrounding production areas.
1 i ne pri ces fa 11.

Consumers may gai n.

As projects come on

Pressures on 1ess 'effi c-

ient farmers pile up. The process of displacement is accelerated.
Measured at the national level the benefits from the program are
mixed.
ii.

Intrinsic costs may still be too high; the project cannot suck
busi ness from surroundi ng areas.
15

Conti nued subsi dy is requi red

to get output (ie success). Farmers in competing areas who are
basically more efficient will be driven out by the subsidized
production from the project.

After supply narrows back down

prices may rise, subsidies may be reduced, but there is still no
guarantee of enough profit to cover social costs as defined
earlier. Consumers appear to gain in purchasing power because the
terms of trade shift in their direction.

This is an illusion to

some degree because the consumers are the ones who bear the
subsidy and at least part of any failure to cover social costs.
These arguments i ndi cate that the most sui tab 1e si tuati ons
for an irrigation project require (in every instance) a productio~

cost structure that permits competition in an efficient

way or international comparative advantage where exports are
concerned.

In any situation where there is potential competition

for "identified" markets from other zones or areas or there is a
possibility of increased food imports, there is special

pressure

for the project to be cost efficient in real terms. Of course,
there are pl aces in the world where an immense amount of irrigation already exists and a new project is simply a small expansion of an existing structure.

Consequently, there is no partic-

ular competition from rainfed

agriculture.

In such situ-

ations the requirement for cost effectiveness at the farmers'
level may not be quite so pressing.
Mainly Fro. National Level
A.

As we ha ve seen, pri mary benefi ts for proj ect farmers mayor may not
be high enough to insure reasonable family income from the project.
If the farmers are subsidized, they naturally seem to do better--but
16

that amount of betterness, from a national standpoint, must be accompanied by a raise in GNP great enough to cover the farmers production
costs as well as to cover the social subsidy on construction.

If

farmers are required to pay the full construction costs, the potential
for realized profit mayor may not be enough to recompense all the
factors of production.

This explains the tendency

high-price crops in order to augment

to search for

the benefit stream and justify

expensive construction.
S.

I f "hi gh powered" crop producti on is requi red in order to get a project's SIC rati 0 up, a new sub-obj ecti ve emerges.

Thi sis the

requirement to train farmers to take on new tasks. Such tasks may
increase the complexity of project operation by requiring farmer
marketing support functions, or other new or different farmer organizati on. More resources are requi red.
Thi s pattern has been observed and repeated many ti mes. There
seems to be some tendency among project leaders, planners, and
designers, when things do not function quite as expected, to search
for ways lito make it work" Most attempts

to improve poor projects

invo1 ve pouring more resources into the same rat hole. "Forcing a
project to work" is the well-spring of recent development literature
featuring all the mumbo-jumbo about farming systems.
SlMCARY

Irrigation benefits, in many cases, are unlikely to reward farm families enough to fully offset construction subsidies.

As a consequence,

irrigation projects are turned into welfare programs. As we have noted
earlier, in and of itself, this may not be necessarily evil or wrong
because society may have other goals besides achieving higher production.
17

Nevertheless, it should be recognized that wel fare programs can absorb
endless quantities of resources that must be paid for by someone, somewhere, someti me.
More and more international donors are insisting upon financially
sound projects. This requirement stiffens up the repayment burden by shifti ng the load from the genera 1 exchequer onto the backs of di rect benefi ciaries. Tightening up performance requirements is one explanation of donor
interest in repayment ability of farmers and upon schemes to charge for
water.

Donors realize that all subsidy has to be covered

and if the

projects cannot stand on their own feet financially then the subsidy repayment

must come from other sectors in society.

And most nations

in need

of increased production and economic development, as well as social
programs, are not the kinds of societies that have a lot of surplus paying
power in non-agriculture sectors.
Another reason for the interest in repayment ability is that engineers
want to pour concrete. They are always anxious to be abl e to show farmers
in just what way it is possible to pay for evermore expensive undertakings--in other words if the farmers can pay, there is 1 ess reason for
central government to come up with the bucks.

There is no new strain on

the development budget since the farmerswillpickup the tab.
Perhaps another reason for emphasis on repayment ability is to put
more development emphasis on the private sector.
to invol ve making the direct

This automatically tends

beneficiaries pay according to the "benefit

principle," because water use is quite specific and chargeable.
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